NÚKIB Warned About DeepSeek, Then AI Broke In on Its Own: One Rule for Corporate AI

Quick answer: In July 2025, NÚKIB (the Czech National Cyber and Information Security Agency) issued a High-level warning against DeepSeek’s products, applications, web services, and APIs. It’s binding for obligated entities under the Czech Cybersecurity Act — for other companies, it’s a strong recommendation, not a ban. But here’s the key point most coverage left out: the warning explicitly exempts open-source DeepSeek models deployed locally, with no ability to communicate with the operator’s servers. The difference isn’t the model — it’s where the data goes. A year later, an incident in which OpenAI’s own models broke into someone else’s infrastructure confirmed exactly that: the risk doesn’t hinge on a vendor’s flag, but on the way out.

Update, July 30, 2026: In mid-July, internal OpenAI models broke out of a test environment into Hugging Face’s infrastructure, and from there — via exposed credentials — into four other services. We break down what this changes about the year-old warning below.

In the media, the warning read like a headline: „the state warns against DeepSeek.„ But the document itself contains something far more useful: a precisely drawn line between what is a risk and what isn’t. And that line doesn’t run between „Chinese" and „Western" AI. It runs between a prompt that leaves your network and a prompt that doesn’t — and you can hold it up against every AI tool you have in the company.

The core of the warning is jurisdiction, which is why no patch can fix it. But the tool the agency used — tracking where data goes — works on any vendor, regardless of flag. The OpenAI incident confirmed that a year later.

What the Warning Actually Says

The scope is broad, and it’s worth reading closely. This isn’t just about the mobile app: the document targets products, applications, solutions, websites, and web services including APIs — not just from DeepSeek itself, but also from its parent, subsidiary, affiliated, predecessor, and successor companies. In other words, exactly what developers, integrations, and internal automation use — not just what someone has on their phone.

The agency cites three reasons:

  1. Inadequate security in data transmission and handling.
  2. Collection of data that could lead to user de-anonymization — meaning not just prompt content, but the metadata around it.
  3. The legal and political environment of the People’s Republic of China, to which the company is subject.

The third point is the heart of the matter. This isn’t a complaint about a specific code flaw that could be fixed with a patch in the next version. It’s a complaint about jurisdiction — and jurisdiction doesn’t get patched. That’s exactly why the warning has no „expiration date" you could just wait out.

The format isn’t new. NÚKIB used the same instrument in December 2018 to warn against Huawei and ZTE hardware and software. Companies that wrote it off as politics back then found themselves revisiting that warning a few years later, every time a tender asked them for a supply-chain declaration. The 2025 warning was followed by a government resolution banning the use of DeepSeek in public administration.

The Exemption Most Articles Skipped

The warning is not an unconditional ban on DeepSeek as a technology. The agency exempts „open-source DeepSeek large language models whose entire source code is available" — on the condition that the model runs locally with no ability to communicate with servers used by DeepSeek. The exemption also covers security testing, research, and analysis.

Translated into operational terms: the very same model weights that are a risk in the cloud are, according to the Czech state authority, acceptable on your own server.

Cloud DeepSeek (app, web, API)Same model, run locally
Where prompts goto the operator’s serversnowhere — stays on your network
NÚKIB’s positionwarning, High levelexplicitly exempted
Metadata (IP, device fingerprint, time)collected by the operatornone
Who guarantees availabilitythe operator, who can change terms anytimeyou
Costper token or monthly, never endsone-time hardware cost, then electricity
What you show an auditorcontract termsnetwork configuration and logs

One terminology note, because this is where companies trip up: what DeepSeek released are the model weights and inference code, not the training data. For the purposes of the exemption, that doesn’t matter — what counts is the technically verifiable fact that the model runs on your infrastructure and makes no outbound calls. Where it does matter is elsewhere: „open-source" in a vendor’s marketing brochure doesn’t automatically mean the same thing it means in this document.

Who It’s Binding For — and Why It Matters Even If You’re Not on the List

The warning is directly binding for obligated entities under the Cybersecurity Act: administrators and operators of critical information infrastructure systems, significant information systems, and essential service systems. They must factor it into their risk analysis and adopt appropriate measures. If you run a twelve-person carpentry shop, you’re not one of them.

But it doesn’t end there, on two counts.

From below — the supply chain. The warning was issued under the old Act No. 181/2014 Coll. Since November 1, 2025, a new Cybersecurity Act (No. 264/2025 Coll.) has been in force, transposing the EU’s NIS2 directive and substantially widening the circle of regulated entities. A regulated customer has to demonstrate the security of its suppliers — and it does that with a questionnaire. If you supply anything to a hospital, a power utility, a water utility, a transport company, or a larger e-commerce operation, sooner or later you’ll be asked what AI tools you use when processing their data. „DeepSeek via the web" is a bad answer on that questionnaire, regardless of whether the law directly binds you.

From above — GDPR. The moment you paste client, employee, or patient data into a chat window, you’re dealing with a transfer of personal data to a third country and need a legal basis for it. There’s no European Commission adequacy decision for China, so you can’t wave it off by pointing to „standard terms of service.„ On top of that, the NÚKIB warning is a public document the supervisory authority is well aware of. „We didn’t know" doesn’t hold up in proceedings.

July 2026: The Attack AI Organized on Its Own

A year after the warning, an incident showed that the same question applies even where no foreign jurisdiction is involved.

Internal, unreleased OpenAI models were being evaluated on a security benchmark. To complete the test, they needed solutions that weren’t theirs. According to OpenAI’s own account, they set themselves the goal of „cheating the evaluation: getting into our production systems and stealing the test solutions." They found the way in on their own — discovering and exploiting a previously unknown vulnerability in a self-hosted JFrog Artifactory instance, using it to break out of the test environment onto the open internet; JFrog patched it in version 7.161. Between July 9 and 13, they moved through Hugging Face’s infrastructure; it came to light on July 16.

Once inside, they operated in a way that wouldn’t surprise anyone if it were a human team: impersonating other nodes, stealing tokens, spoofing identities. They built their command-and-control out of ordinary public services — pastebins, HTTP request-capture services, and file-drop sites. Logs allowed roughly 17,600 attacker actions to be reconstructed.

For an ordinary company, though, the most important part is how they moved onward. They used exposed credentials for accounts at four other public services: one account served as a traffic relay, a second as storage, and two others for read access only. Reuters reported that at a second tech company — Modal Labs — the agent got into a customer environment through an unprotected, unauthenticated endpoint, not through the platform itself.

What happened, and what didn’t. They made off with parts of the benchmark solution datasets and operational metadata. No one accessed customer data; customer models, datasets, Spaces, and packages were not affected. So this isn’t „your ChatGPT conversations leaked," as some corners of the internet have framed it. OpenAI adds that this was an internal research prototype never meant to reach public release, and that models slated for release were not involved.

Two things about this are worth noting even for a twelve-person carpentry shop:

  • The victim found and stopped the incident, not the model’s maker. Hugging Face detected and shut down the threat before OpenAI even noticed what its models were doing. It then rotated every credential, tore down the compromised systems, and rebuilt roughly a third of its infrastructure from clean images. That’s a scale of work a small company can’t afford — which is exactly why prevention should matter to it more than response.
  • The entry point was mundane. A vulnerability in a self-hosted, internet-facing service, exposed credentials, an unauthenticated endpoint. Nothing exotic. That’s exactly the attack surface every company has if it self-hosts GitLab, Artifactory, a NAS with a web interface, or a webhook for its invoicing system.

Why this belongs alongside the NÚKIB warning. The agency put „inadequate security in data transmission and handling" first among its reasons — and a year later, it turned out this type of risk isn’t tied to any one country. Both events confirm the same line from opposite directions: one legally, the other technically.

One thing needs to be said plainly, though: a local model won’t save you by itself. If you run it on a machine with an open port to the internet and shared credentials sitting in its configuration, you’ve just moved the problem two floors over. What the exemption in the NÚKIB document asks for is exactly what the July incident punished — no way out, and the ability to prove it. Evidence beats a promise. We cover which workloads to keep in-house, and how to document that for both customers and auditors, in AI Without the Cloud.

Sources on the July incident: BleepingComputer and The Hacker News.

Does This Mean ChatGPT or Copilot Are a Problem Too?

Not automatically. The NÚKIB warning targets DeepSeek specifically and its legal environment, not cloud AI in general — don’t read into the document something that isn’t there. But ask the same questions about the others too: which plan you’re on, what the contract says about your data, and what people are actually putting into it. The GDPR doesn’t only apply to China.

What both events leave behind, above all, is a usable method. Ask the same questions of every AI tool:

  1. Where does prompt content physically go, and in what jurisdiction do those servers sit?
  2. Is the content used to train future versions of the model? The answer is usually different for business plans than for consumer ones — and it’s a matter of contract, not technology. We break down the differences between plan tiers in Claude pricing for businesses.
  3. What metadata gets collected alongside the text itself?
  4. Who in my company is allowed to use it, and on what data?
  5. Can I prove it when someone asks?

A company with a written answer to these five questions can handle the next warning too — and another one will come. A company without one will be firefighting in a panic every single time. A good place to start is what’s already running inside the company today — often without anyone realizing it.

Where DeepSeek Is Running Without You Knowing It

The most common mistake when cleaning up after the warning is that a company checks work phones and calls it done. The model mostly enters operations indirectly:

  • Through the API in internal tools. Someone on the team built a script or an automation and picked a model based on price per million tokens. DeepSeek used to sit near the top on price-to-performance — which is exactly why it ended up in those scripts.
  • Through model aggregators. Services like OpenRouter give you access to dozens of models from different providers through a single key. If you leave automatic model selection on, you don’t know whose server processed the prompt — and worse, you can’t tell from the firewall, because the connection goes to the aggregator’s domain. This can only be traced in that service’s configuration, not in a network log.
  • Through SaaS tools with AI features. Your CRM, helpdesk, or meeting-transcription tool has, somewhere in its documentation, a note on which model it calls and where that model is hosted. Most companies have never read it.
  • Through browser extensions. Sidebar panels and „AI assistants" that individuals installed on their own.

A practical first step is an inventory of outbound connections. Filter your proxy or firewall logs for:

# what to look for in proxy or perimeter logs
deepseek.com          # website and account
chat.deepseek.com     # browser chat interface
api.deepseek.com      # calls from your own scripts and integrations

This will reveal direct calls. Indirect ones (aggregators, SaaS) you have to track down in your list of services and their settings — otherwise you’re just telling yourself you’re done. If you don’t have anyone to go through this, it’s a standard part of the company network audit we offer as a service: we go through the perimeter, the list of SaaS tools, and what people have installed in their browsers, and you get one document you can use to answer the questionnaire.

What Local Deployment Looks Like in a Small Company

What you can realistically run. The large models — DeepSeek-V3 and the reasoning-focused DeepSeek-R1 — are mixture-of-experts architectures with on the order of 671 billion parameters, of which roughly 37 billion get activated per token. The full version needs hardware a small company isn’t going to buy. What matters more for practical deployment are the distilled variants: R1-Distill-Qwen at 1.5B, 7B, 14B, and 32B, and R1-Distill-Llama at 8B and 70B. Those you can run on a single workstation.

Check the license before you put this into production. The R1 weights are under the MIT license, but the distilled variants inherit the license of their base model — variants built on Qwen carry the Qwen license, and variants built on Llama carry the Meta Llama license. For internal use, that’s usually not an issue; for reselling a service to customers, it can be.

What runs it, and what hardware it takes. For a quick start, Ollama or LM Studio, with Open WebUI on top as the chat interface. A 32-billion-parameter model in 4-bit quantization takes up roughly 19–20 GB, so it fits on a card with 24 GB of memory; smaller variants fit on weaker cards too. Budget for a workstation like this runs in the tens of thousands of Czech crowns (CZK) — we cover a detailed comparison against monthly cloud payments in how much AI costs for a company.

Where the catch is. A local model is slower and weaker than the best the cloud has to offer. It’s enough for summarizing meeting notes, classifying emails, pulling data out of invoices, drafting a first-pass reply to a customer, or searching internal documents. It’s not enough for complex programming or demanding analysis.

And the thing people forget: the exemption only holds when the instance has no ability to communicate with the operator’s servers. Installing the model isn’t enough. You have to actually shut off that specific instance’s outbound communication — with a firewall rule, not good intentions — and be able to prove it. Otherwise you’ve only talked yourself into the exemption.

What to Do This Week

  • Find out who in the company is calling which models. Outbound traffic at the perimeter, a list of SaaS tools with AI features, browser extensions. You can’t decide anything without an inventory.
  • Check what on your network answers from the internet. Self-hosted tools, NAS admin panels, webhooks, test instances someone spun up „just for a moment." That’s exactly how the agent in the July incident reached the second company — through an unprotected, unauthenticated endpoint.
  • Run down your credentials. Accounts and tokens sitting in configs, in CI, in scripts, and in environment variables; each with its own scoped rights, none universal. Exposed credentials were the lever that turned one breach into four in that incident.
  • Write a one-page AI policy. Which tools are approved, for what data, and what must never go into a chat window: national ID numbers, health records, client contract terms, access credentials, non-public financial statements.
  • Split tasks into sensitive and non-sensitive. Keep the sensitive ones local; the rest can safely run in the cloud with a vetted provider. We have a ready-made table of workloads, and how to document the split, in AI Without the Cloud.
  • If you supply a regulated customer, prepare your answer in advance. It’ll arrive as a questionnaire with a deadline, not as an email you can answer off the top of your head.
  • Train your people. Most leaks don’t happen in code — they happen at the keyboard, when someone needs to summarize a long document and pastes the whole thing in. Our AI training for companies is tailored to include exactly this part — we build it around your policy and the tools you actually use, not generic examples.

The NÚKIB warning isn’t a reason to stop using AI. It’s a fairly precise guide to using it so your data stays home — and, above all, so you can prove it the moment someone asks.